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‘ O brother, do not behave like this’ 
Moral Controversies and ‘empirical’ validations in the Himalayas 
 






Is it possible to imagine that one may feel morally right to kill and decapitate an old man in 
the middle of the night who is completely defenceless andwho had been particularly kind to 
you when you were a child?According to cultural relativism, this a distinct possibilityif you 
belong to a culture where such behaviour is effectively acceptable and you have been 
socialised in it and interiorised its values.But if you strongly believe in the universality of 
moral values, you will no doubt consider that any one who is not perverse would 
spontaneously find such behaviour completely abhorrent, whatever his or her culture, his or 
her educationand the sort of legitimacy  which may be claimed for such an act.Finally, if you 
are following some of the recent researches taking place in the anthropology of morality, you 
will probably judge that both perspectives are not necessarily contradictory; you may consider 
that much depends, from a methodological point of view, on the level of analysis taken into 
consideration.One may then consider simultaneously that: 
 
- All human beings share spontaneously, perhaps even genetically, an equal repulsion to killing 
an other human being, especially so if one knows him personally and he is defenceless, as it is 
often the case in the revenge killings which take place in the sort of Himalayan feuds that I 
have been studying .  
 
- But in spite of such a spontaneous repulsion whose existence may evenhave been proved if 
you agree with the findings of  some experiments by developmental psychologists, it is 
nonetheless the case that in certain cultures such practices have been not only regularly 
practiced but have also considered perfectly moral and legitimate, and also accepted as such, 
in particular by people who practice such feuds. 
 
The relevance of the analytical distinction - eventually also the compatibility – between, on 
the one hand, innate moral dispositions which may well have an universal character and, on 
the other hand, other moral characteristics which are much more culture-specific – has been 
highlighted in  thepioneering works of Elliot Turiel in the eighties (Turiel 1983) . But new   
research has also developed more recently around this same distinction, both in cognitive 
anthropology and in cognitive psychology. 
 
What I have been surprised to discover is that anthropological works about India have  played 
a relatively central role in  contemporary debates of cognitive psychology and anthropology 
around this same distinction. Richard Schweder, one of theleading specialist in the domain, 
seems unconvinced that such a distinction put forward by Turiel and others, makes sense in 
every culture (Shweder and al. 1983) . Most interestingly, he does not seem to consider that it 
is relevant in India, because the very idea that morality could be considered as context 
dependant is not supposed to  not make sense for Indian people. I have no reason to contest  
the ethnographic evidence collected by Shweder in Orissa (1983) but I have serious  
reservations about the possibility of extending its validity for the whole of Indian society. I 
happen to have worked some years ago about feuds which weretaking place in parts of the 
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Himalaya whereHindu culture is prevalent.  And I willargue that one can‟t find a better 
illustration of the moral dilemmas which may result of thecontradiction between inner moral 
dispositions and  public norms. Aclear consciousness of the existenceof these two levels of 
moral preoccupation was completely explicit, both  in the discourseand in the behaviour of 
the local people. My paper will be then based on the ethnographic data that I was fortunate 
enough to obtain from the very people who participated directly in these feuds, either because 
they murdered other people or because they were the parents of some of the victims. 
 
Taking then a different perspective that  the one defended by Shwedder about India, I will 
attempt, in the first part of this paper to demonstrate the relevance of the analytical distinction 
made by Turiel, Sperber, Baumard and others between moral dispositions of an universal 
character and contextualised public norms of morality, for a better understanding of the 
ethnographic reality of these Himalayan feuds. In the second part of my paper, however, I will 
then endorse a remarkoften made in arguing against  racismbut which is  also used by Sperber 
where he insistsrightly on the fact that one may generallyfind as many differences in moral 
attitudes within a particular culture asbetween different ones. But, rather than using this 
argument for downplaying the epistemological importance of cultural relativism, I will use it 
to emphasise the paramount importance of individual variationsin the anthropology of 
morality.   
 
The methodological approach that I wish to advocate here hasnot much to do with the mild 
form of cultural relativism advocated by Swheder and others; but neither does it identify with 
attempts to downplay the epistemological importance of cultural or individual variations in 
the moral domain and torather focuson the underlying similarities which may specify moral 
attitudes as such. Everyone will admittoday that one can‟tadoptan evolutionary approachto the 
natural worldwithout also examining in minute detail how historical and individual variations 
occur. Similarly, I believe, one can‟t expect either to understand how moral regimes take 
shape or eventually disappear, without paying the same attention into how minute individual 
variations  which occur in any culture may contribute to the study of moral values. But before 
I come to this point, I will introduce briefly a few ethnographic facts to demonstrate  in India 
like elsewhere, the existence of universal moral feelings which don‟t seem to differ 
fundamentally from the ones that one may find elsewhere in the world and which  may also 
be distinguished analytically from the more culturally specific values which characterise the 
feuds in this Himalayan region. 
 
II. FEUDS IN THE HIMALAYA 
 
The clans that practiced feuds in this Western part of Himachal Pradesh where I workedin the 
eighties were called Khund to differentiate them from other local Rajputs. They were 
organized into large, patrilineal clans (dhai or biradari), comprising anywhere from a few 
hundred to several thousand individuals, who acknowledged a common ancestry and were 
divided into several lines of descent (al), sub-divisions (khandan), families and homes.Most 
of my enquiry about feuds consisted of analysing their social and cultural meanings, which 
can be studied, like any other social facts, from many points of view. One may try to 
understand their dynamics, and one finds that, in this particular case, the focus was alwayson 
the threat that the ghost of the last victim represented for the people of his clan. Tradition 
demanded that one cut the head of the victim (or that one took, at least a tuft of his hairs) 
when he was ritually murdered during a feud. As a result, the dead man could not be cremated 
and he would become a ghost as long as his death was not avenged. Of course, when people 
took revenge on another clan, there was always an element of retaliation involved. But I 
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believe that a more fundamental reason for taking revenge was in order to placate their own 
dead clan-member. In fact, the collective prosperity of a clan was at stake in the taking of 
revenge. This was because in most cases, local mediums – spiking on behalf of local 
goddesses - attributed the misfortunes of life to the ghosts of those who had not been avenged. 
 
Moreover, when one considers the entire complex of feuding traditions from a symbolic and 
religious point of view, and when one studies the rituals associated with them, one notices 
that revenge is linked in many aspects to a sacrificial scheme. But considered froma more 
sociological point of view, feuds also hadmany social functions; for example they helped to 
reinforce the links between individuals, and they gave a very strong sense of collective 
identity to the clans. They also resulted in a well-defined hierarchy amongst the clans that 
practiced feuding, and those who were considered their dependants. Finally, another 
important result of these traditions in the past,that I mention only en passant, was that people 
in the valleys where feuding was commonly practiced had a very strong sense of autonomy 
vis-à-vis royal authority and State administration. 
If one combines then these various perspectives on these traditions, I believe that one may 
achieve quite a fair interpretation of these feuds from a sociological point of view, and may 
also provide some sort of insight both into their meaning and social consequences (Vidal 
1989, 1994, 2004). In order however to study more specifically their moral dimension, there 
is no better methodthan to dig a bit deeper into the specific details of one particular feud. So 
this is what I wish to do. 
III. STATES OF MIND 
  
1. FEARLESS and TRUTHFUL 
 
Listening to the way some of the local Rajputs who participated in  these feuds described their 
state of mind when they were going to take revenge from other clans, one   could 
easilybelieve one was confrontedwith realRomans:  
 
 When we went, we did not care for our life. We wanted only to kill. We had to kill one or 
two of them; and even if we had to die, what mattered was to fulfil our duty by killing them. 
Whether they had to kill someone or be confronted with  the possibility of being 
killed, it was obviously their moral fortitude,constantly strengthened by their practice 
of feuds, which was supposed to distinguish them from the rest of the local inhabitants 
and justify their hegemony at the top of the local social hierarchy. The paradox is that 
the spirit of cooperation, supposed toprevail during a feud amongst the members of 
each of these warrior clans, was strangely extended tothe attitude they were supposed 
to display also toward their victims.  It was considered, for example, as a ritual 
obligation to announce clearly to them their fate beforekilling them; and it was 
apparently expectedthe victims would know how to take this news withdignified 
stoicism:  
Among our dependants (ghara) the lowest ones are the Khanara. You can't eat or 
marry them. When we (the Khunds) were going to fighttogether, if we surrounded 
a man with our bow and our arrows and – if we tried to know his feelings -by 
threatening to kill him, we normally expected that he would open his shirt and 
say: 'you may kill me with an arrow in the chest, but my people will take revenge'; 
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but if he was running away by fear, then we caught him and the leather of the 
string of the bow was put in his mouth. He was then forbidden to come in front of 
the Khund for fighting, and – no one in his biradari could take any part of the 
fight between the Khunds. Then he was called a Khanara; and nobody had – any 
relationship, anymore, with him. 
One may notice en passant that such an ideology, which asks for the theoretical consent of the 
victims, is not limited only to the feuds. It isequally at the core of the Hindu doctrine of 
sacrifice. In the same region of the Himalayas, for example, one still can‟t make an animal 
sacrificeunless the animal shakes slightly when some water is thrown on it just before its 
killing. Such reactionisoften interpretedby people as the „proof‟ that it is effectively 
acquiescing to his fate. 
The Khund who were participating to feuds did not only boast about their courage and 
stoicism, but also their truthfulness 
"When I was taken (afterwards) to Jubbal, then King Bhagat Chandra told: he 
looks just like a child; he could not kill any one. He can't be the murderer. Many 
people then told me not to say anything; but I replied: no; I will never tell a lie; 
this is not the tradition of my khandan (household). Someone told me that I will be 
hanged. Never mind; I will accept it. Because I ever have to bear the sin (pap) of 
having beheaded him; and I don't want to commit a second sin. 
But if I felt always ready to listen to ancient murderers like the one that I have just quoted, it 
is also becausethy did not only boast about their fortitude and the one of the other 
membersthese warrior clans.Paradoxically, they did not hesitate either to describe in grim 
details but also with a moving honesty, the horror and the moral distress equally shared, it 
would seem, by all those who participated to these feuds. 
HUMANS AFTER ALL 
Nolens, volens 
 
While listening to the participants in these feuds, It appeared clearly, for example, thatmost of 
this people  may well have deeply interiorised the fighting ethos of their warrior clans; but 
this did not mean they necessarily put themselves forward spontaneously or enthusiastically 
when they were selected by the members of thecouncil of their clans to participate in the 
feuds: 
D. Jaildar told us during the meeting of N: R. uncle, you will have to go. K told to 
J.: "J.R. you will have to go"; R. told to M.R.: "you will have to go". K. said that 
R. from the D. khandan will have also to go. It is how they selected the killers. 
As it was also often stressed to me, once someonehad been chosen to participate in a feud, his 
innermoral feelingswere largely irrelevant:  he was givenvery littlelatitude to retracthimself 
and to shy away from his duty. 
I would have never slain him; but only God knows. Who had to be slain was to 
be slain. It was due to enmity. I replied (to my companions): "Ô God, you will see 
that I will not slay him, whatever may happen". But they compelled me and told 
me: "ô son, they were also brave people who slew unborn children. Ô stupid; you 
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say only that because -they used to warm you up by making some fire for you. 
Will you not slay him!” At last, I slew him. I will not tell a lie. When I have 
committed a murder, then why should I tell a lie now? Why would I implicate 
others? ...Then, we came back from there, and we lived in a cave that we used 
for a while as a base. And all of them wanted to convince me to slay him. I 
requested them not to ask me to do this evil's work because he was like a father 
for me. But they insisted so much. ……You must do it, otherwise you will have to 
promise that you leave N. hamlet and P. hamlet; and you will never have 
anymore any relation with the Sanaï biradari. And we will be nothing to you". 
They washed my brain like this for three days. And finally, I slew this man. 
 
The detailed accounts of  killers were in contrast to the rather heroic manner in which 
feuds were presented otherwise when described in  the abstract. Murdering someone was not 
exactly a pleasant task, especially, if you liked the person that you had to murder and he was 
defenceless.  And the victims did not necessarily react in a more stoic manner than the young 
men who had the ominous task of decapitating them with an axe.  Most would try to avoid 
their fate, either by arguing or by attempting to fight back with their attackers.  
 
- We killed a man. We told him to wake up: "Get up; we have come – for the 
revenge. We must take it at any cost then he said: "Ô brother, I did nothing"… 
 
- Yes, there was a fight when we told him that we were going to behead him. We 
told him: "yes brother, we are Pajaïk and you are a Sanai. We have to take the 
revenge (badl"). Get ready. He tried to throw my father and I into the river. He 
was strong and brave, just like a lion. Ipulled him back and I struck him with my 
axe with folded hands. But it was not enough. He got up and he beat my father 
with the mesh. Then my father took the axe from my hands and separated his head 
from his body. 
 
But even once they had managed to accomplish their task, the murderers were far from being 
safe, worrying even more, it would seem, about the ghost of the man just killed than about the 
other members of the clan of their enemies: 
 
I did not see any ghost (bhut). When we came back, all my companions used to 
walk in front, and I was coming last, because of their fear of ghosts. They were 
saying: "look, they have come, they will slay us, they will kill us". I asked them 
what they were talking about, because I could not see anything, just bushes with 
sharp branches. But they were so frightened; they were becoming mad. 
 
2. No exception with India 
 
Once one accepts to listen to the people involved in these Himalayan feuds – especially those 
who played a role in  killing  their enemies, there is really little reason not to accept the thesis 
put forward by Turiel and other cognitive anthropologists, according to which one can 
distinguish between moral dispositions shared universally and public norms which may, on 
the opposite,  be largely culture specific.  As a matter of fact, one did not even have to 
worrythat the existence of universal moral valuesis implicitand can be only postulated rather 
than demonstrated. If I took the libertyto introduce many quotes in this paper, it was precisely 
to showthat in this particular case, the fundamental distinction drawn by Turiel  is not even  
purely  „analytical‟. One may simply demonstrateits existence, I believe, by listening 
 6 
attentively to what people involved in these feuds have to say when they are given the liberty 
not only of giving the „official‟ version of these traditions but also of expressing openly their 
feelings about them. Furthermore, the contrastthat I have been pointing out is not specific 
only tothis feuding tradition, even if one may find in this case, aparticular clearcontrast  
between the ideology of these feuds and the inner moral dispositions of the participants. The 
same contrast is equally apparent when one considers more generally the ideology of 
Hinduism. A good illustration ofit may be found, for example, in the BhagavadGita, one ofthe 
most revered text of Hinduism. The whole text is precisely based on the moral distress felt by 
Arjuna when he realises the extent of the discrepancy between the public norms and  moral 
duty which impose themselves upon him, as being, on the one hand, a warrior king who must 
lead his army on the battlefield; but also, on the other hand,  a moral and sensitive human 
being, anticipating sadly the extent of the human slaughter which is going to result amongst 
his former friend and of his kin when  the battle will begin. 
Looking at the feuding traditions of this region of the Himalayas where Hindu culture 
prevails, one can‟t dispute the fact that people belong to a local culture where it was 
legitimate to kill innocent and defenceless people under certain circumstances. But whatever 
one may think about these traditions, it does not mean that people would lack the same moral 
feelings that one may find in all other human beings: even if  it does not mean either, as I 
suggestedin the introduction, that one should underplay the epistemological importance of 
individual and cultural variability in the study of morality, from an anthropological 
perspectiveor even from an evolutionary one. I will attempt to show it now, based on the same 
ethnographic material. 
 
II. Modern Times 
 
According to Nicolas Baumard one may define morality (“la morale’) as a way of dealing 
with situations where individual interest and collective interest are conflictual (Baumard 
2007).  So, as long as feuds may be described as above, there is no particularproblem for 
using effectively an analytical definition like this one:  whatever moral dilemmas people may 
experience during the course of these feuds, they could however distinguish normally 
between their moral feelings, personal will or individual interest; and what could be defined 
as collective values and collective interest.However, while discussing how such 
traditionswere evolving in recenttimes, people often insisted on the fact that public values 
which had been traditionally used to legitimate these feuds, were being questioned more and 
more. A simple quote may clearly illustrate such a tendency : 
 
When so many disputes were going on, when you could not harm your enemies, 
you would take their sheep or their wives. It was how enmity was going on. At that 
time people were very foolish; we were also foolish; but now, we know better. At 
that time we did not know much. One finds that, according to the shastras, the 
murder of a man is equal to the murder of sixty cows. You may kill a man or sixty 
cows; the sin will be the same and you will have to bear it. But if you think about 
it as a Khund, by taking the revenge you have accomplished a great job. But if you 
consider it according to the Dharmashastra", then you have committed a sin. 
The problem, however, is that not everyone however shared the same point of view. 
Individual decisions taken by the actors involved in the feuds did not rest anymore on moral 
values whose meaning was shared oreven clearly understood by all. Let me show it by 
discussing briefly the rather oddturn that feuds had recentlytaken when I did my fieldwork 
through the initiative of a few individuals. This will help us from an anthropological 
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perspective to better understand not only the evolution of thesefeuds as such; but also, 
perhaps also , on the basis of this example, the sort  of logic conditioning  the  interplay 
between  morality and tradition. 
 
A moral mutant 
 
Nobody should seriously expect that anyone could take in any culture lightly the fact of 
murdering one‟s neighbour.  But once you had been designated to do it, youroptions became – 
as we have just seen – rather limited. Either you accepted the challenge, whatever could be 
your inner moral feelings about it. And you could evenbe rewarded by a cerminial price for it 
if you managed to murder one of your enemies. Oryou did not accept the injunction to 
participate in the revenge. And whatever the reasons you may invoke for such a refusal, you 
would seriously  risk seeing your social status degraded and being socially boycotted or even 
condemned to exile for the rest of your life. So, as long as most people imaginedeffectively 
not to have anyother alternative beyond these two possibilities, it seems most relevant  to 
distinguishbetween the public norms they were constrained to follow and their inner feelings. 
But what unexpectedly happened during the feud that I was studying in particulardetailswas 
that one man – let us call him Dev Singh - extraordinarily decided not to accept simply the 
terms of this   alternative. 
 
There was any doubt in hisparticular case that he was the one who had to take the 
responsibility of taking the revenge of the murder of his brother as  part of an on-going feud 
with another warring clan. He could do it either by killing his murderer with his own hands or 
- as it was more often done – by simplyoffering a ceremonial gift to whomever in his clan was 
willing to do it or designated for doing it. What Dev Singh was certainly not supposed to do 
but what he actually did, was refuse to take the revenge and more significantly, he made clear 
to all other members of his clan that he refused to give any ceremonial price to anyone who 
dared, against his will, to take the revenge in his name. Although I was living in his house and 
that I came to know himquite well, I never managed to obtain– except in very vague terms - 
the exact reason for his decision. There is no doubt, however, that he had to pay rather dearly 
for his decision even if no one actually obliged him y to quit the house or leave definitively 
his hamlet andthe territory of his clan. 
 
He was severely boycotted for many years bymany people in his clan. But things got the 
worse when the local  goddess - feeling that nobody had  listened to her demand for revenge -  
decided to retaliate by keeping definitely silent.People assumedalso later that it was because 
the ghost of the man who had not been avenged that the whole clan had suffered bad crops 
forsuccessive years. But in spite of all the social pressure accumulated against him, my host 
kept his determination not to break his promise and refusedany form of revenge on behalf of 
his brother.   
 
According to thelocal people, what helped him  the most to maintain his determination at ths 
stage was the fact that – in spite of the irritation of the local goddess against him – he had  
three sons in quick succession during the following years. This was interpreted by most 
people around as a serious proof that he could not be completely in the wrong andthat he had 
not been completely  abandoned by thegods. The fact that he managed to survive relatively 
successfullythe boycott imposed on him, eventually convinced some of them to reconsider 
their moral judgement about him. But this does not necessarily make easier to qualify his 
behaviour from a more  analytical point of view. 
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It would not make sense, indeed, to say that a man like him preferred to follow his personal 
interest rather than the collective one. The personal cost for him was too ominous for that: by 
not taking personal revenge, he was taking a real social risk, a risk serious enough 
toincitemost people in the past to silence any moral repulsion to kill.  But one could not say 
either that he hadclearly chosen to privilege the collective interest over his own. At least, it 
was certainly not what other members of his clan had felt when he acted as he did. The 
paradox, however, is that in spite of  being unable topredict the consequences of his act, not 
only did he find himself ultimately rewarded with the birth of three sons in quick succession; 
butthe murderer of his brotherwas the one who felt he suffered the most of his decision, as I 
will show it now briefly. 
 
A cultural relativist 
 
By announcing publicly not only that he would not take revenge for his brother, but alsothat 
he would refuse to reward anyone doing it in his name, my host was the first one to step out 
of the local tradition in this way. this was, at least, what people had  told  me. But a no less 
innovative step was to be taken by the murderer of this brother when he chose to make  an 
ominous decision, a few years later. He then decided that if nobody was daring to appease the 
spirit of the man that he had killed, he would have to do it himself. He decided to effectuate a 
long and difficult pilgrimage tofour of the most sacred sanctuaries of India in order to appease 
the soul of the man that he had murdered. It was, indeed, a most unusual ritual step.  By doing 
so he assumed  a  ritual role which should have been accomplished  in the Hindu tradition by 
no one but  the elder son of the deceased man. This is even one of the main reasons invoked 
to explain why most Indian people wish so keenly to have a son.  One could eventually accept 
– when there are no other possibilities left - that a brother or a close relative substitute 
themselves to a son to fulfil such  ritual duty; but certainly not, in any case, the very man  who  
murdered the person whose spirit was to be placated 
 
«You may have come, but not whole heartily. And your father will never come. 
Your father refuses to take anything touched by me. I requested him ten times to 
do so: 'O brother, do not behave like this. We are the same. You did not go there. I 
have visited the four places of pilgrimage, which are the four corners of India. I 
have made the Pinda karna" for him (M.S.S.). In the four dams, I treated him as 
my father and I became his son. I worshipped him like my father. Now if your 
father says that what happened was unavoidable and that we should forget it; and 
if he takes food touched by his enemy and if the food that he has touched is given 
to his enemy, then it will be possible to have a real compromise » 
 
 
But if the murderer chose to act as he did, it was clearly not in his case, a fully 
disinterested gesture or a purely moral impulsion. According to the people, his motivations 
were more pragmatic:  he had never managed to have a son – he had only four  girls – after he 
participated as a young man to the feud. And he attributed it paradoxically - it would seem - 
the very fact that no attempt had been made to take revenge for the man that he had killed.  
 
J. is completely changed, as he has no sons; only four girls were born to him. He 
thinks that as he has committed the murder of an innocent man, God has punished 
him. But R.R. is a very cruel man, still nowadays. 
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By acting in this way our murderer not only innovated from a ritual point of view; but, as he 
explained it as well, he arrived at  the conclusion that one should seriously reconsider local 
traditions and think anew about their legitimacy. So, ultimately, in this case  - like in the case  
of the brother of his victim -  one could not relate the behaviour of this man to a clear conflict 
between existing public norms and inner moral dispositions; nor  to any obvious contradiction 
between his personal interest and those of his  community; even if -  soon after he came back 
from his pilgrimage -  he managed incidentally to have his first male descendant (by taking 
also a younger wife, which may help!). 
 
This man had been then shifting  from a rather conservative social posture to a much more 
innovative one. While I was doing my fieldwork, feuds remainedglorified in hundreds of 
songs, and they still played an important role in the social life in these valleys. But  if the 
cultural fabric upon which they  rested seemed  now rathershaky, it was  largely , I suspect, 
because  of the  unexpected behaviour of people  like the two that I have briefly described. 
However, as I will show, they were not the only ones to react unexpectedly to the changing 
times. 
 
A failed revivalist 
 
I want to  mention finally here the initiative of yet another man, also deeply involved in the 
latter episodes of this feud.  He was the medium of the local goddess who decided to remain 
silent because she was not being listened to.  But also like the previous man that I have just 
described , this onealso had some  grief of a more personal nature. He considered that it was 
because of the ghost of my host‟s brother that he had  remained  childless. But  rather than to 
attempt to appease in a peacefully way the soul of the victim, he decided to take the revenge 
into his own hands and to go with his father to kill any man belonging to the clan of  the 
murderer.  
 
I thought and I said that I will take the revenge for my lineage (khandan); and 
what may happen will happen! The day was calculated; and when we came back 
with the head, a great ceremony was organised. Havan was done, halwa was 
offered, gun firing was fired, drums were beaten, the Devi puja was done and a 
flag was put on the temple of the Devi.  
It seems that he effectively managed to kill a man of the other clan, cutting his head off and 
offering it clandestinely to the goddess of his clan.  
 
Pandit Shiv Ram Jolta was invited, this day. We did the Havan and we told him 
not to disclose the matter, otherwise he would be killed. When the head is being 
offered, a wooden char mandal is necessary, and then Devi worship is going on. 
Then Kali will come (through the trance of the medium, my comment) and she will 
say that one will not have to face any form of hardship because she is the one who 
takes the responsibility for it, she, Kali. Havan is then organised with drum 
beatings (the ritual sacrifice, my comment) (cf note 3.). And it is what we did. 
Then we kept quiet and silent. We were in hot water; because we knew very well 
that, as soon as they would know it, the feud would start again and it would never 
end.  
He  succeeded also to obligethe family of the first victim to pay him - against their wish - a 
ceremonial price for the murder. What he did not manage however was to have  a son and he 
remained childless. More significantly, in spite of what he had done, everyone in these 
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valleys, refused to acknowledge openly the existence of this last murder. While most people 
in both clans  knew perfectly well what had happened, they preferred to ignore it and to 
consider simply that an unfortunate accident must have happened to the  man who had been 
murdered. 
 
The ‘two period’ theory 
 
A common methodological mistake in anthropology is what one might call : “the two periods 
theory” . It consists in assuming too easily  that – once upon the time – things were  seriously  
different from what they have become, without serious  knowledge (or study) of the  past . In 
the anthropology of India, a huge amount of research dedicated to caste gives  a good 
example of this. For a long time, it was assumed that one could effectively studythe social and 
cultural implications of the caste system, without taking into account modern or foreign 
influences and Indian history, more generally. It took nearly a generationto show that 
seductive anthropological theories such asthe distinction between holism and individualism, 
for example (Dumont 1967) may perhaps be built on such a basis; but they were never 
grounded convincingly either in historical or in empirical terms (see Bayly 2001). One should 
not believe however that the  „two period theory‟ is the only preserve of social scientists.  In 
the case of the feuds that I have introduced here, local understandings of history was also 
fundamentally based upon the notion that people‟s behaviour in the past was very different of 
what it had become more recently: if one may then  summarise how local feuds had been 
described to me, it seems that one may fundamentally distinguish between  two periods of 
time, each of them characterised by a different manner of conceiving the articulation between 
moral feelings and  cultural  norms in this context.  
 
As long as people spoke about the past , they systematically insisted on the fact that whatever  
inner moral feeling people may have had, the people who participated in  this tradition could 
hardly  refuse to play their role in them, if they did not want to risk losing their social status or 
to be definitely exiled from their community . a quote of one of the murderer demonstrates 
clearly well the sort of dilemmas they  were supposed to be confronted to. However in 
modern times, the same informants insisted on the fact that public values used to legitimate 
these  feuds were seriously questioned; not only that but individual people – like the one that I 
have described –publicly refused to participate in  a feud in order not to  offend anymore  
their moral convictions. As  a consequence of it, some of the other actors involved in these 
feuds came also to reconsider their signification. But such a feeling – as I have already shown 
– was not necessarily shared by everyone around. The  main characteristic of the more recent 
episodes of the feuds I studied seemed to reside in the fact that no consensus existed amongst 
their protagonists, in order to know how they should behave, either individually or 
collectively. Drastic decisions, taken by some of the main actors involved in these feuds did 
not rest anymore -  ifever it had been the case - on common values whose meaning was shared  
if not necessarily approved by everyone around.  Significantly also,the behaviour of all the 
protagonists had become less and less predictable:  a goddesseswas sulking because nobody 
listened to her when she  asked  for revenge; a murdererwas going on a pilgrimage to expiate 
his crime; and  people were not even  sure if a compromise had been reached or not  between 
previously fighting clans and whom one should consider as one‟s enemy. The following 
dialogue between a murderer, an other member of his clan and the nephew of his victim in the 
clan of his enemies is showing it  particularly clearly: 
 
First Sanai: the ones who favoured the compromise have favoured it but others 
have not favoured it. Some of the Sanai say : we still want our sacred drum (a 
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nagar) As long as we don't get back our drum, we can't have relations; we can't 
go to the places of the Pajaik.  
Second Sanai:and what about the Pajaik ? Do they come to our place…. ? 
 A Pajaïk: but I have come to the marriages and I came also to some fairs. What 
do you make generalities like that. I came To Bagna".  
First Sanai: You may have come, but not whole heartily. And your father will 
never come. Your father refuses to take anything touched by me. I requested him 
ten times to do so : 'O brother, do not behave like this’. 
 
The question however is to know if one may still  find, in spite of this,  some underlying logic 
in the culture in regard of these traditionsat the time while I was  studying then? 
III: THE  MORAL OF THE HISTORY 
 
if one comparesthe behaviour of the three men that I have just described, there is something 
very striking in their way of dealing with this feuding tradition: on the one hand, it is difficult 
to find more contradictory choices than the ones they made in such a context: the first one 
breaks the tradition by deciding not to take revenge; the second one had previously killed a 
man but afterwards, he radically changed his perspective and condemned his past behaviour; 
and the third one tried, without much success, to restore the tradition by taking revenge. 
But on the other hand, what is even more striking is that the three men who took such 
contradictory decisions nevertheless shared the same conviction  that parhaps the most 
significant  sanction for their acts - and an „empirical' proof of the rightness of their respective 
decisions , from their point of view , clearly shared at this point of time by the whole 
community  - was the birth of a son.  They saw it all as some sort of endorsement by the gods 
of the rightfulness of their decision, even if from every other points of view, there were 
striking contrasts in their respective understandings of the situation: 
- my host could then easily convince himself that he had taken the right decision by choosing 
not to take revenge; he had been blessed, after all, by the birth of three sons. 
 
- The  man who had killed the brother of my host convinced himself later on that he had 
committed a sin even if he had  not realised  it at the time.  The main reason for this, 
according not only to him but  also to other  people  was the fact that he did not have a son 
afterward, but only four daughters. The fact of being „blessed‟ with a male descendant after 
he hadgone on pilgrimage to appease the soul of his victim, convinced him definitively that 
one should renouce local feuding traditions altogether. 
 
- Even  the man who decided, on the contrary, to renew the tradition of feudingfollowed a 
similar reasoning. The main motivation behind his gesture was also linked to the fact that he 
had no sons, something he attributed to the displeasure of the goddess for not being heeded 
when she asked her followers to take revenge. But in his case however, the fact that he did not 
manage to have a son, even after having accomplished the revenge, seemed to demonstrate 
that it was wrong to renew this bloody tradition. 
Evidently, there is no „empirical‟ reason but only purely cultural one why one should 
associate the behaviour of the people during these feuds with the birth of a male descendant. 
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But such an association was constantly  made by my informants ;  and if one examined the 
respective destinies of the main protagonists in this feud from this perspective, it appears 
clearly that all of them had been converged aroundthe same conclusion: whatever may have 
been the legitimacy of such feuds in the past, the decision not to take revenge, and to reject 
the tradition of feuding, seemed to be for the time being, the correct one because it was the 
one which happened incidentally to result in the birth of a male „descendant‟ . On the other 
hand, any attempt to perpetuate the feuds or to renew the tradition, seemed to lead only to 
misfortune and to a lack of male descendants. 
Such an example shows very concretely, how, in times of political and cultural changes, 
people may be driven to question the validity of some of their traditions and to assess, in their 
own way, the 'empirical' consequences of ending them or preserving them. But in order to 
understand what is going on here, we must also be aware that the 'empirical' criteria which are 
put to use in these sorts of circumstances often correspond as well to highly specific cultural 
values (i.e. in this particular case, to the overwhelming importance of producing male 
offspring). 
However, one question remains: must one consider that such an analysis only makes sense for 
periods where traditional values are changing in such a way that people feel more strongly the 
need to test their moral legitimacy? I would like to suggest that such an 'experimental' 
dimension of  moral values can rather be found in most cases if one tries to analyse the way 
people deal concretely with them. But, of course, the importance of such 'experimentations' – 
individual as well as collective -and the sort of changes to which they lead, also vary 
according to the ability of a whole community to react to the results of their experiments with 
their own values, at a given period of time. 
So, in this particular case, most people in these valleys clearly rejected the ideology of feuds. 
But most of them were still deeply implicated in the very intricate and often dramatic process 
of proving to each other (and to themselves)  that their decision to renounce their traditions 
was effectively the right one.  
Byfocussing onthis very  minute level of analysis, one may contribute, I believe,to the study 
ofthe ethnography and the history of  India.  I triedto analyse - on the basis of another 
fieldwork in India –the reasons why a debate about the nature, use and legitimacy of violence 
became so widespread in Indian socety in the twentieth century. For the fact that this debate 
was taking place all over India, explains - I believe -  the success and emblematic role of 
Gandhi in the years leading up to Independence ,  not the other way around (Vidal  1997). I 
also attempted  to show with other colleagues of mine ( Gilles Tarabout, in particular)that a 
deeper understanding of the nature of the moral debate on violence and the factors it involved 
may allow us to analyse some decisive aspects of the of Indian society and culture with 
greater clarity. WhatI attempted to show here is that such research may help us, as well,  to a 
better understanding of the  underlying processupon which any evolutionary conception  of 
morality should rest. 
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